The Head of Department of Political Science, University for Development (UDS), Dr Gbensuglo Alidu Bukari, has stated that extending the presidential term from four to five years raises serious concerns about accountability, power concentration and democratic vigilance.
“Ghana’s history of authoritarian rule makes any expansion of executive tenure politically sensitive, as it may weaken electoral checks and embolden incumbency abuse,” he stated.
In an interview, Dr Bukari noted that proposals by the H. Kwasi Prempeh Constitution Review Committee (CRC) to increase the presidential term from four to five years, with two terms, would entail longer-term risks of entrenching executive dominance rather than improving governance and development outcomes, without strong countervailing institutions such as an empowered Legislature, an independent Judiciary and a robust media.
He explained that, from that perspective, the political and economic governance deficits in Ghana were less about term length and more about institutional discipline, political culture, and the enforcement of accountability mechanisms. “In my humble opinion, caution is warranted in endorsing term extension without comprehensive complementary public administration reforms,” he noted.
The senior political science lecturer noted that proponents of a five-year presidential term argue that the current four-year cycle is insufficient for long-term policy planning and implementation, particularly in a developing democracy such as ours, where institutional capacity constraints already delay execution.
He said the review proponents contend that frequent elections incentivise short-termism, populist policymaking, and perpetual campaign mode, which undermines developmental governance.
Dr Bukari said a longer term could, in theory, allow Presidents to focus more on structural reforms, infrastructure development and policy continuity without the immediate pressure of electoral calculations.
Touching on the issue of separation of powers, Dr Bukari noted that Ghana’s constitutional architecture of the First Republic of 1960, the Third Republic of 1979 and the Fourth Republic of 1992 subscribed to the doctrine of separation of powers, with clearly demarcated roles for the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary arms of government.
Dr Bukari said that had always been the case, beginning with the First Parliament of the Fourth Republic, which began on January 7, 1993, except the Eighth Parliament, which produced a hung parliament of 137 Members each for the NDC and NPP following the December 7, 2020, parliamentary election.
“The consequence is an accountability deficit, as parliamentary scrutiny of executive action is often subordinated to party loyalty and political expediency,” he said.
He, however, said strengthening the separation of powers did not necessarily require adopting a pure presidential or parliamentary system but rather recalibrating existing arrangements to restore institutional balance.
Dr Bukari said proposals to reduce the number of ministers and separate the executive arm from parliament could enhance the autonomy of parliamentary committees and professionalise the legislative arm of government.
“A functional separation of powers is essential not only for democratic theory but for effective governance, political accountability and public trust,” he said.